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Abstract
Given the role of human behavior in the spread of disease, it is vital to understand
what drives people to engage in or refrain from health-related behaviors during a pan-
demic. This paper examines factors associated with the adoption of self-protective
health behaviors, such as social distancing and mask wearing, at the start of the
Covid-19 pandemic in the USA. These behaviors not only reduce an individual’s own
risk of infection but also limit the spread of disease to others. Despite these dual ben-
efits, universal adoption of these behaviors is not assured. We focus on the role of
socioeconomic differences in explaining behavior, relying on data collected in April
2020 during the early stages of the Covid-19 pandemic. The data include information
on income, gender and race along with unique variables relevant to the current pan-
demic, such as work arrangements and housing quality. We find that higher income
is associated with larger changes in self-protective behaviors. These gradients are
partially explained by the fact that people with less income are more likely to report
circumstances that make adopting self-protective behaviors more difficult, such as an
inability to tele-work. Both in the USA and elsewhere, policies that assume univer-
sal compliance with self-protective measures—or that otherwise do not account for
socioeconomic differences in the costs of doing so—are unlikely to be effective or
sustainable.
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1 Introduction
The spread of illness is largely influenced by human behavior. In the presence of
strong externalities, a concern is that individual behavior may not align with socially
optimal outcomes (Posner and Tomas J. P. 1993). This is especially salient in contexts
where the costs of protective behaviors, i.e., behaviors that limit the spread of ill-
ness, are unevenly distributed across socio-demographic groups (Pampel et al. 2010).
For instance, in the Covid-19 pandemic, individuals who face a relatively low risk of
serious illness, but who are economically vulnerable (e.g., lacking comfortable hous-
ing, the ability to work from home) may not follow recommendations or directives
to engage in protective behaviors, such as wearing a mask or social distancing. This
potentially puts high-risk groups in danger of infection and prolongs the pandemic.
The socially optimal amount of protective behaviors—the levels that balance pub-
lic health concerns with individual burdens and aggregate economic costs—are not
yet fully understood, and are unlikely to be for some time due to uncertainty about
the virus and about which behaviors most effectively prevent its spread (Manski
2020). Compounding this uncertainty, we do not yet understand the full extent of
the economic and social costs of the pandemic, ranging from job losses, shuttered
businesses, and gaps in schooling, to violence and addiction, among others (Fair-
lie et al. 2020; Alon et al. 2020; Mongey et al. 2020; Coibion et al. 2020; Viner
et al. 2020). Nevertheless, understanding what factors affect individuals’ incentives
to engage in protective behaviors will be of critical importance as we develop effec-
tive and humane policy, evaluate the current epidemic, make plans to emerge from it,
and begin to prepare for future pandemics.
This paper examines factors predicting adoption of individual self-protecting
behaviors at the start of the Covid-19 pandemic in the USA. We focus on the
USA since the country lacks a consistent national policy on Covid-related behav-
iors, leading to a variety of different state-level policy responses and individual-level
behavior changes (Adolph et al. 2020; Béland et al. 2020). Moreover, there is vari-
ation in local infection rates at a given point in time (Allcott et al. 2020b; Manski
and Molinari 2020) along with vast socioeconomic inequality across US citizens.
Together, these features of the US context allow us to examine how individuals
with different characteristics and facing different policy environments respond to a
pandemic. Moreover, the lessons we learn extend beyond the USA. For example,
economic inequality—and, potentially, resulting variation in the costs of engaging in
self-protective behaviors during an infectious disease pandemic—is present in other
countries.1 Indeed, non-compliance with self-protective measures is not unique to the
USA. Starting in the Fall of 2020, Europe has experienced a “second wave” of the
Covid-19 pandemic, driven in part by people opting to not comply with local public
health measures (WHO 2020).
1Future work could explore the degree to which the socioeconomic patterns we present here extend to
other countries. Findings in Adams-Prassl et al. (2020a) and Briscese et al. (2020) suggest that similar
patterns can be seen in the UK and Italy, though Germany might be different. Related, and using the same
data set as the one used in this paper, Belot et al. (2020a) examine demographic patterns (focusing on age)
in self-protective behaviors across countries.
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Our study uses unique survey data collected during the third week of April 2020
and detailed in Belot et al. (2020b). The data set follows roughly 6000 individuals in
6 different countries and includes about 1000 individuals from the US, who are the
focus on this study. Roughly 250 individuals come from each of four US states: Cal-
ifornia, Florida, New York and Texas. The specific factors we study include income,
socio-demographic variables (e.g., race and gender), pre-pandemic health character-
istics, job and income losses due to the pandemic, work arrangements (e.g., the ability
to tele-work) and housing quality (e.g., access to outside space at home), along with
beliefs and perceptions about the pandemic (e.g., whether individuals perceive social
distancing to be an effective measure and the consequences of infection). We study
how these factors relate to three measures of behavior change from before the pan-
demic to the point of data collection. In particular, respondents were asked whether
they changed any behavior at all in response to the pandemic; whether they increased
social distancing, which includes avoiding public spaces, running fewer errands and
visiting friends and family less often; and whether they increased hand washing
or mask wearing. The data have information on a host of additional self-protective
behaviors (and similar income gradients emerge when we examine them). We chose
to focus on these three measures because they illustrate the wide range of possible
self-protective behaviors: the first is very broad, including any change in behavior at
all; the second is a relatively high-cost activity; and the third is a relatively low-cost
activity.2
We begin by documenting a striking and robust pattern apparent in the data: higher
income is associated with larger increases in self-protective behaviors. Figure 1 illus-
trates this relationship for the three aforementioned behaviors for the US sample.
Note, the figure plots changes rather than levels. Using these measures, we show
that on average individuals in the fifth income quintile (quintile mean $233,895) are
between 13 and 19 percentage points (16–54%) more likely to increase their self-
protective behaviors compared to individuals in the first income quintile (quintile
mean $13,775).3 For each of these behaviors, the difference between the first and fifth
income quintile is statistically significant at the 1% level. It is worth noting that some
of the stronger income differences in the figure appear when we compare low versus
middle and high income. For example, hand washing and mask wearing changes are
larger for middle versus low-income individuals, but are not larger for high- versus
middle-income individuals. While increases in social distancing appear to increase in
magnitude across the income distribution, we cannot reject that individuals in third,
fourth and fifth quintiles increase the behavior the same amount. For changes in any
behavior, we find significant rises across the income distribution. These finding sug-
gest that higher income is generally associated with larger increases in self-protective
behaviors and, moreover, that some differences are concentrated at the bottom of the
2It is worth noting that examining all of the factors could lead to concerns of multiple hypothesis testing.
Hence, we limited our analysis a priori to the three behaviors stated above. While they capture different
actions, we are in effect testing one hypothesis—whether socioeconomic variables predict self-protective
behavior change—using three measures of the outcome variable.
3Quintile means come from the Tax Policy Center, administered by the Urban Institute and Brookings
Institution.
693
















Changed Behavior Increased Hand Washing−Mask Wearing Increased Social Distancing
Fig. 1 Probability of changes in self-protective behaviors by income quintile: This figure shows the pro-
portion of US respondents within a household income quintile that reports changes in any self-protective
behaviors; reports increased social distancing; and increased hand washing-mask wearing. We also plot
the estimated trend relating each changed behavior to income quintiles. The gray area is the associated
95% confidence interval
income distribution, meaning that low-income individuals may face especially large
costs to adopting such behaviors. Our subsequent analysis aims to shed light on these
relationships by assessing which specific factors related to income help to explain
differences in behavior change.
In particular, our main analysis explores these relationships between income, the
pandemic and self-protective behaviors in two ways. First, we ask how income relates
to initial consequences of the pandemic along with other factors that could affect
social distancing and other self-protective behaviors. We illustrate the burdens lower
income respondents face, ranging from increased chances of job and income losses
due to the pandemic to limited access to remote work or to open air space at their
residences. Taken together, this means that we would expect these people to have a
harder time adopting social distancing behaviors, which may prolong the pandemic.
Next, we examine which socio-demographic characteristics predict self-protecting
behaviors. To do so, we estimate a series of linear probability models where a
change in self-protective behaviors is the outcome variable and the predictor vari-
ables include income along with different sets of additional variables, culminating in
a final specification that includes income along with all variables. Several patterns
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emerge. Work arrangements and housing characteristics, particularly transitioning to
tele-working and access to outside space at home, are associated with adopting more
self-protecting behaviors. We also find that income losses due to the pandemic are
associated with larger increases in the behaviors that we examine. Surprisingly, we
find no meaningful patterns between pre-existing health conditions and increases in
self-protective actions. We also show that males and respondents from Florida and
Texas are less likely to engage in self-protective behaviors compared to females and
respondents from California and New York, respectively. Moreover, beliefs about the
effectiveness of social distancing along with perceived benefits (e.g., more time spent
with family) correlate with larger increases in self-protective behaviors, though less
so for lower income groups, which we discuss below. Finally, we demonstrate that the
income gradient is only partially explained by the inclusion of these variables. The
size of the income coefficient estimates are fairly stable across specifications where
different sets of controls are included. These findings suggest that while income is
an important predictor of behavior change, this relationship is only partly explained
by the other factors we examine. There are likely to be other variables not captured
by our data that help to further explain why income matters so much in the adoption
of self-protecting behaviors.
Broadly, our findings are consistent with two key ideas. One, the initial economic
consequences of the pandemic are particularly harmful to low-income individuals.
Two, behaviors that stem from the pandemic could place relatively large burdens on
individuals with lower incomes. For example, higher income individuals are more
likely to report being able to work from home and more likely to have transitioned
to tele-working instead of losing their job. As a result, adoption of self-protective
behaviors, such as social distancing, are more practical, comfortable and feasible
for people with more income, which is evident in the behavior changes depicted
in Fig. 1. Effective and sustainable pandemic policy should be based not on what
policymakers wish individuals would do, but what they expect them to do. To the
extent that socioeconomic status helps to predict behavior, it should play a role in the
development of policy. Further, to the extent that specific and policy-relevant factors
help to explain income gradients, they could shed light on new avenues to mitigate
the harm of a pandemic. For example, our results suggest the importance of outside
space at home in predicting the adoption of self-protective behaviors. If so, opening
parks, which may seem frivolous and unnecessarily risky at first glance, may actually
be a prudent policy to prioritize. Doing so could potentially encourage self-protective
behaviors by providing outside space to those who lack access to it.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we provide an
overview of the existing literature on Covid-19 pandemic and socioeconomic health
gradients. In Section 3, we provide a brief history of the Covid-19 pandemic in the
USA. Section 4 discusses our data source and provides a preliminary data analysis.
We then discuss the results from our main analysis in Section 5, which quantify
the associations between individual characteristics and behavior changes. Section 6
concludes.
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2 Literature review
This paper relates to a number of ongoing research efforts that, on a nearly daily
basis, provide new information on the current pandemic and people’s responses to it.
To the degree our questions and findings overlap, we provide crucial replication in an
era of rapid-response, hastily completed research. When questions or focus differ, we
provide new information that other efforts do not. Finally, if we provide contradictory
answers to similar questions, this is also important since it highlights where further
research is needed.
Many studies have examined the connection between individual behaviors and the
spread of disease. For example, Adda (2016) examines the spread of viral diseases
stemming from economic activity. Others have looked at the role of human trans-
mission in the Covid-19 pandemic. Qiu et al. (2020) document the role of human
mobility in spreading Covid-19 in China. Their analysis highlights the importance
of public health policies that limit mobility as a means of lowering transmission.
Bonacini et al. (2021) explore the case of Italy, evaluating the effectiveness of dif-
ferent lockdown policies, showing that the government’s initial measure of closing
all schools and universities was most effective at slowing the growth of Covid-19
cases in the country. The impact of human behavior on disease spread has also been
documented when looking at multiple countries. For example, Milani (2021) high-
lights the role of social networks in the transmission of Covid-19 within and across
countries. Zimmermann et al. (2020) reach similar conclusions about the impact of
human behavior on the spread of the pandemic, arguing that the best strategy to miti-
gate future pandemics is to understand the human factor and move swiftly to mitigate
it at the start of an outbreak. Our results are in line with this view. Our focus is on
identifying which specific “human factors” related to socioeconomic status seem to
predict behavior change and should thus be taken into account when responding to a
public health crisis such as a pandemic.
Other studies have examined the economic impacts of the pandemic. For exam-
ple, Adams-Prassl et al. (2020a) conduct a nationally representative survey of the
UK, US and German population on the labor market impacts of Covid-19. Their
findings highlight heterogeneous impacts across countries. In particular, employ-
ees in Germany were affected less by the crisis than individuals in other countries
due to a well-established unemployment insurance system. Still, the pandemic exac-
erbated existing inequalities within each country. Another is Béland et al. (2020),
which quantifies the economic impacts on wages and employment from stay at home
orders in various American states. They demonstrate that despite significant eco-
nomic losses from the pandemic, these orders were cost effective when taking into
account the value of a statistical-life. Other studies have focused on work arrange-
ments such as work from home. Examples include Bonacini et al. (2021), Saltiel
(2020), Okubo (2020), and Rahman (2020), which examine the types of occupa-
tions and workers that have the ability to work from home and how they have been
affected by the Covid-19 pandemic in countries outside the USA. A component of
our contribution is linking individual demographics to access to tele-working in the
USA. Beyond this descriptive exercise, we are able to link this work arrangement to
income and self-protective behaviors during the pandemic. This connection helps us
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highlight how the burden of measures such as social distancing fall heaviest on lower
income groups.
A related set of papers provides evidence of differences in the effects of the pan-
demic by socioeconomic status. Mongey et al. (2020) analyze the characteristics of
workers in jobs that are most likely to be affected by social distancing measures. They
demonstrate that these people are more economically vulnerable and live in areas
that engage in less social distancing.4 Our paper makes a direct contribution to this
line of literature. The data set we use in this paper was designed to capture detailed
information about economic losses individuals experienced. Examples include work
transitions, realized monetary losses and expected monetary losses. By directly link-
ing economic impacts to individual behaviors, we are able to provide a clear picture
of what factors predict observed behavior discrepancies, which in turn suggests poli-
cies that could encourage more widespread adoption of behaviors that slow the
pandemic.
Indeed, a separate strand of the Covid-19 literature closely related to our study
examines how individual characteristics and demographics predict or influence
behaviors during the pandemic. For example, Ashraf (2020) explores the relationship
between socioeconomic factors, government policy and Covid-19 health outcomes
using a rich panel data set covering 80 countries. The author finds a strong negative
association between Covid-19 cases and socioeconomic conditions, which can be
alleviated by government policy. Other papers, such as Andersen (2020), Chiou and
Tucker (2020), and Wright et al. (2020), rely on cell phone data to track individual
behavior during the pandemic. These papers have documented that the adoption of
social distancing measures varies across observable characteristics, such as average
neighborhood income. These papers have the benefit of bypassing individual report-
ing, which may be biased, a point we return to when presenting results. Our paper
generally corroborates findings using cell phone data. Additionally, our survey data
permits a more granular analysis in that we can examine a richer set of individual-
level variables, such as beliefs about social distancing and detailed work transitions.
Finally, Wozniak (2020) uses a unique US data set, also publicly available, to relate
disease exposure to decisions to work or take protective measures. She finds that peo-
ple with Covid-19 exposure continue to work at similar rates as the non-exposed, and
people with elevated risk for contracting the disease do not reduce work hours or take
protective measures. We place greater attention on the associations between an indi-
vidual’s protective behaviors and their characteristics and beliefs, while she focuses
more on protective behaviors through the lens of risks factors (i.e., an individual’s
susceptibility and potential spreading) and protective behaviors.5
4Also related, Borjas (2020) illustrates socioeconomic discrepancies in access to testing in New York City,
showing that those without access also tend to be people with the highest probability of a positive test.
5Wozniak (2020) also provides evidence of declines in well-being due to the pandemic, which relates
to Adams-Prassl et al. (2020b), who document a decline in female mental health in the USA due to the
lockdown measures to contain the pandemic, that are not explained by other factors such as financial or
childcare stress.
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In the US context, many papers have also examined links between political affil-
iation and self-protective behaviors. Examples include Adolph et al. (2020), Allcott
et al. (2020a), Barrios and Hochberg (2020), Painter and Qiu (2020), and Simonov
et al. (2020). In general these studies find that individuals that identify as Republicans
or who live in areas with higher levels of support for President Trump and Republi-
can elected officials are less likely to engage in self-protective behaviors or adhere
to shelter in place orders. While we lack data on political affiliations, we find simi-
lar patterns when looking at individuals located in Florida and Texas, two states that
voted for Trump in 2016 and 2020 and are led by governors that are vocal supporters
of President Trump and his administration.
More broadly, this paper relates to a vast literature studying how socio-
demographic characteristics associate with health and health behaviors. While our
contribution reports evidence in a very specific context, the Covid-19 pandemic, it
is noteworthy that many of the same relationships found in other health contexts are
evident here.6 In other words, well-documented socio-demographic differences in
health behaviors—and resulting health disparities—extend to the current pandemic
(Yancy 2020).What we learn about behavior during a pandemic, a period when stakes
are high and shifts in behavior are swift and large, can help us to understand health
behavior differences more generally. As a concrete example, if we learn that cer-
tain types of work arrangements prevent social distancing, such arrangements may
prevent a host of other healthy behaviors that are unrelated to the pandemic. In this
way, the current pandemic can provide useful directions for future research on health
behaviors and health disparities.
Finally, this paper relates to a literature examining the tension between individual
behavior and public health in the presence of externalities. A key historical anal-
ogy is the HIV epidemic.7 In that context, reduction of risky sex behavior not only
protected individuals, but also slowed the spread of the virus, which is socially ben-
eficial. The social benefit means there is a positive externality and thus potentially
a sub-optimally low level of safer sex. In the current context, the tension between
private behavior and public health is exacerbated by the fact that many of the peo-
ple asked to incur the most brutal economic and social costs of protective behaviors
face relatively low personal risk of serious health problems. This opens up a host of
broad and general ethical questions about who should bear the greatest costs to pro-
tect public health. It also casts doubt on the sustainability of policies that presume
full compliance.8
6Cutler et al. (2011) provide an excellent summary and overview of the socioeconomic status-health
gradient literature.
7Papageorge (2016) and Chan et al. (2016) are two studies which examine the history of the HIV epidemic
to make broader points about health. More generally, Cawley and Ruhm (2011) provide a summary of
the literature that examines cases where individuals make a trade off between controllable behaviors and
health outcomes.
8Many of these ideas were explored in a recent blog post by DeLuca et al. (2020). The current study builds
on this piece, in part by using data to test hypotheses it put forth.
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3 Covid-19 in the USA
As our focus is on the response to the Covid-19 pandemic, it is useful to recall the
circumstances respondents were facing at the time our data were collected (the third
week of April 2020). The first confirmed Covid-19 case in the USA was announced
on January 20, 2020. About a week later, the White House Coronavirus Task Force
began meeting on a daily basis. Over the next 13 days, cases in the USA remained
relatively low but grew in other countries. On February 2, 2020, President Trump
restricted entry into the United States by non-citizens who were physically present
in China. Over the month of February, cases in the USA remained relatively low but
the virus was being closely monitored by the government. On February 29, 2020, Dr.
Anthony Fauci stated that Americans did not need to change their daily practices and
that the current risk of the virus was low, while cautioning circumstances may change.
The government maintained this message for the next week and a half. For example,
on March 8, 2020, Dr. Fauci encouraged the public to not wear masks and reserve
them for use by healthcare professionals and those who had fallen ill (Goodman and
Schulkin 2020).
The situation took a grave turn a few days later. On March 11, 2020, the World
Health Organization officially declared Covid-19 a global health pandemic. Later
that day during a prime-time Oval Office address, President Trump announced addi-
tional travel restrictions to the USA from 26 European countries. Two days later,
the president declared the coronavirus a national emergency. During the first two
weeks of March, case counts rose steadily. By the third week of March, hospi-
tals reported severe shortages of testing supplies, personal protective equipment and
other critical supplies. Near the end of March, President Trump signed the CARES
Act, a wide-ranging measure aimed at curbing the economic effects of the pandemic
and procuring additional supplies to treat the disease. By this time, over 10 million
Americans had filed for unemployment benefits (Goodman and Schulkin 2020).
Towards the end of April, when our survey data were collected, cumulative cases
in the USA reached nearly 1 million and Covid-19 was the leading cause of death
in the country. On April 23, the final day of our data collection, Mr. Trump infa-
mously advised citizens that the digestion of bleach may be an effective way to
combat the virus (Goodman and Schulkin 2020). This is an example of the depths
of misinformation being shared with Americans about the pandemic and how to best
guard themselves from infection. It is possible that the release and amplification
of this content through certain media could explain observed income gradients for
self-protective behaviors. For example, Simonov et al. (2020) explore how regional
compliance with social distancing varies with Fox News viewership. To address
questions about misinformation, we include beliefs about the effectiveness of social
distancing in our empirical analysis.
From the start of the pandemic, the White House largely relied on state and local
governments to devise and implement public health measures to combat the virus,
offering virtually no unified national strategy. This pattern is highlighted by the states
included in our survey sample. As case counts rose steadily during the first two weeks
of March, California was the first state to take large-scale action. On March 19,
Democratic Governor Gavin Newsom ordered all 40 million Californians to stay at
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home as much as possible, closing all non-essential businesses (Arango and Cowan
2020). The next day, New York’s Democratic Governor Andrew Cuomo issued a sim-
ilar directive, noting that cases had risen from 0 to 2900 in just over 2 weeks (De Avila
2020). New York would go on to become one of the most heavily affected states by
the pandemic. Florida’s Republican Governor Ron DeSantis did not implement any
sort of lockdown order until April 1, 2020, when the number of cases surpassed 7000.
In fact, the day before the measure was announced, Governor DeSantis said he had
no plans to issue any statewide measure because the White House had not instructed
him to do so (Barbash and Horton 2020). Texas’ Republican Governor Greg Abbott,
responded somewhat faster than Florida. Governor Abbott announced a patchwork of
local restrictions on March 19, 2020 (Svitek 2020a). As cases in Texas grew, Abbott
resisted calls for stronger restrictions but eventually relented, announcing a state wide
stay at home order on March 31, 2020 (Svitek 2020b; 2020c).
Similar to lockdown orders, the federal government provided no unified policy
on mask wearing. Trump was not observed wearing a mask publicly until July 2020
and has equivocated on when they ought to be used (Lemire 2020). Like social dis-
tancing, mask wearing policies were again deferred to states to implement as part of
their own policy response. Governors Cuomo and Newsom were early proponents of
masks and frequently encouraged their use before issuing mandates in April and June
respectively (Higgins-Dunn et al. 2020; Romo 2020). Governor Abbott followed with
a mask mandate in July (Siemaszko 2020). As of October 2020, Governor DeSan-
tis has not mandated that masks be worn by Floridians. This summary highlights the
considerable variation in the local responses to the pandemic in the states covered by
our survey data.
4 Data and summary statistics
4.1 Data collection
We rely on recently collected survey data from six different countries by Belot et al.
(2020b). The data were collected between April 15 and April 23 in the USA, the UK,
Italy, China, Japan and Korea. The sample consists of roughly 1000 individuals in
each country. As stated earlier, the focus of this paper is on the US sample, which was
drawn from four states: California, Florida, New York and Texas with roughly 250
people per state. The sample is nationally representative for each country according
to age, gender and household income. For the US sample, the survey is also nationally
representative along race. Prior to the start of data collection, approval was obtained
by the ethics board at the University of Exeter.
The survey firms Lucid and dataSpring assisted with the data collection. Respon-
dents were initially contacted by these firms via email to participate. New invitations
were sent up to the point of achieving the desired representation. Participation was
remunerated according to general compensation schemes defined by the companies
for their survey panelists. Respondents were prevented from taking the survey mul-
tiple times and from finishing the survey too quickly. The median response time for
the survey was about 14 minutes.
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Among the benefits of using this survey data set is that it contains information
that is uniquely relevant to the Covid-19 pandemic. For instance, the survey col-
lected detailed information about how a respondent’s work arrangements changed
(e.g., stopped working, began tele-working). Another example is that information
was collected on the characteristics of a respondent’s home, such as their current liv-
ing arrangement (e.g., alone, roommates), exposure to elderly people and access to
open air. This collection effort also captured information about individuals’ beliefs
on several topics, ranging from the effectiveness of social distancing to how likely it
is that they get infected with the virus.
While these data are valuable and informative about the Covid-19 pandemic, there
are noteworthy limitations. We would prefer to use data from an ongoing study con-
sisting of a large and representative sample, with information collected at regular
intervals from the same individuals. However, to relate socioeconomic differences
to Covid-19, such data simply do not exist. Thus, we must rely on survey data col-
lected quickly. This allows us to tailor questions asked of respondents so we can
answer questions about an unprecedented worldwide shock. Yet, collecting and using
data in this manner has many drawbacks. First, there was a regrettable and uninten-
tional omission: the survey did not elicit information about educational attainment.9
Second, while the survey is representative along important demographic characteris-
tics including age, gender, income and race, it is not a random sample of people in
the USA. As such our estimates must be interpreted with care. In particular, income
groups may exhibit differences that do not extend to the whole population because
there could be unobserved variables correlated to income that jointly predict survey
participation and self-protection behaviors. Moreover, it is difficult to make causal
claims, though this problem extends to large and representative data sets. The differ-
ence is that we lack the data that facilitate standard approaches to help to identify
causal effects, such as additional variables we could use as controls or IVs or repeated
observations allowing us to employ panel data methods. These shortcomings reflect
the realities of conducting research rapidly and in a daily-changing environment.
Still, the patterns we present here are robust and informative. We hope that the anal-
yses and data presented in this paper can inform the development of longer term data
collection efforts that aid us in better preparing for future public health crises.
4.2 Summary statistics
Table 1 summarizes the socio-demographic characteristics and outcomes we study
from the survey sample. Fifteen percent of respondents are non-white, 44% are male
and about 39% are 56 years or older. Forty-five percent of respondents report at least
one pre-existing health condition. While the survey data did not target pre-existing
conditions for representativeness, the prevalence of pre-existing conditions in our
sample closely mirrors the amount in the US population (CMS 2011; McCarthy
2020). Approximately 70% of respondents reported being employed. Among those
9As a robustness check, we use information based on a respondent’s occupation as a proxy measure for
educational attainment and find that main results are unaffected.
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New York-California 0.54 1006
Elderly 0.39 1006
Health
Pre-existing condition 0.45 1006
Housing
Urban 0.41 1006
Home w/o open air access 0.15 1006
Elderly exposure 0.46 1006
Work arrangements and losses
Working 0.70 990
Full-time | working 0.54 701
Part-time | working 0.14 701
Can work from home | working 0.82 701
Stopped working | working 0.38 701
Tele-working | working 0.34 701
Still working | working 0.20 701
Mean income quintile 3.11 1006
Mean lost HH. income ($1000) 0.77 475
Beliefs and perceptions
Mean belief social distancing effectiveness {1–5} 3.99 1006
Mean local infection rate 0.24 971
Benefits from pandemic 0.84 1006
Outcomes
Changed behavior 0.88 1006
Increased SD 0.54 824
Increased hand washing-mask wearing 0.71 933
N 1006
Summary statistics for characteristics of individuals for the entire US sample. The first column lists the
probability that a randomly drawn individual has the listed characteristic or the mean value of the variable
from the sample. The exceptions are full-time, part-time, work from home, stopped working, tele-working,
and still working, which were computed among the sample of respondents that were observed working.
The second column lists the total number of observations for which that variable had a non-missing value
that reported working, nearly 54% work full-time, 14% work part-time and 82% are
able to work from home at the time of the survey when the pandemic was well under-
way. Also among these respondents, 34% report shifting to tele-work, 38% are no
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longer working and 20% reported no change in their employment situation. On aver-
age, respondents lost $770 in household income due to the pandemic. These were
recorded as total household income losses during the first trimester of 2020.10
The survey contains two variables about labor status. The first asks about the cur-
rent work arrangement and the second asks about changes due to the pandemic. Using
these two variables, we construct a single measure that captures possible ways that the
pandemic has affected individuals with different work arrangements. There are five
possibilities: (i) “Never Worked” refers to individuals who were not working prior to
or during the pandemic (e.g., retirees); (ii) “Stopped Working” refers to people who
were working (full-time, part-time or self-employed) and stopped working due to the
pandemic; (iii) “Began Tele-Working” refers to people who were employed prior to
the pandemic and are still employed, but transitioned to working from home due to
the pandemic; (iv) “Still Working” describes individuals who were working prior to
the pandemic and whose work status has not changed; and (v) “Other” includes peo-
ple who report working prior to the pandemic and also report “other” when asked how
their work status has changed. We should note that 17 individuals do not fit into any
of the categories above due to contradictory answers. As an example, some respon-
dents report not working before the pandemic and also transitioning to tele-working,
which is difficult to categorize.11
Figure 5 in the Appendix summarizes this work status variable by age group and
income quintile. As expected, we find that younger respondents tend to be more
likely to begin tele-working whereas older workers are more likely to not be working
before or during the pandemic. We also see that higher income people are more likely
to transition to tele-working, while lower income people are more likely to either not
be working before the pandemic or to have stopped working due to the pandemic.
This pattern is telling, as tele-working likely lowers the cost of many of these self-
protective behaviors, such as social distancing. The share of respondents that were
still working without any change was relatively stable across income quintiles. A
deeper look into the survey finds an intuitive pattern. Those that were in lower income
quintiles and reported still working belong to professions such as cashiers, packers
and packagers, among others. Those in higher quintiles that reported still working
included lawyers, computer programmers and managers. These professions differ
substantially in what they pay, but include people who have been deemed “essential
workers.” This explains the lack of an income gradient for this particular category.
The survey also includes information on beliefs and perceptions. Approximately
73% believe that social distancing is either very effective or extremely effective,
versus 24% who believe it is slightly or moderately effective. Only 3% of the sam-
ple believed social distancing was not effective at all. Almost 39% of respondents
believed it to be extremely effective. On average, respondents believe that 24% of
10Some respondents reported very large income losses. Given the difficultly in determining whether these
are actual losses or survey errors, we use a dummy variable to flag these values. There are 173 of these
observations. Our results are robust to the inclusion of these observations. The only difference is the
magnitude on the lost income coefficient. The number in the table reflects the average of the remaining
values. Conditional on having lost household income, the average loss was just above $2100.
11If we include these observations in the “Other” category, our results remain unchanged.
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the people in their area are infected. This high number is driven by a mass of respon-
dents reporting implausibly high numbers (including some saying over 90%), which
we discuss below.12 We speculate that some of these extreme beliefs could be driven
by the spread of misinformation, which has been shown to have an impact on the
adoption of self-protective behaviors (Simonov et al. 2020). Finally, about 84% per-
ceive some benefits from the pandemic (e.g., getting to spend more time with family
or reducing pollution). As we show below, these perceptions predict behavior.
The survey measures behavior change in two ways. First, respondents are asked
directly if they engaged in any self-protective behavior in response to the pandemic.
About 88% report having done so. Second, the survey asks respondents to report how
frequently they engaged in 15 different activities before the pandemic, at the start
of the pandemic and a few weeks after the pandemic began. These behaviors ranged
from hand washing and eating healthily to visiting large open or closed spaces and
visiting friends and family. Given this data structure, we observe how the respondents
changed their behaviors over time. For each behavior, respondents could answer (1)
never, (2) rarely, (3) sometimes, (4) very often or (5) always. Figure 2 summarizes
the average frequency with which respondents engaged in some of these behaviors
at each time period.13 Consistent with Fig. 3, we see an increase in the average
frequency of self-protective behaviors from before the pandemic to weeks after the
pandemic started. To get a sense of behavior change, we construct a count variable
for each individual for the number of changes towards (or away from) self-protection
from before the pandemic to a few weeks after it had begun, when the data were col-
lected. Figure 3 plots the distribution of the resulting variable for all 15 behaviors
captured by our survey data. The changes are normalized such that self-protecting
changes are positive, while reducing such behaviors is recorded as negative.14 The
median number of changes towards self-protection is 9.
We highlight two main takeaways from Fig. 3. First, few people exhibit a net
decline in self-protective behaviors. Second, most people either do not change their
behavior much at all (note the spike in the distribution at zero) or make a fairly large
number of changes. Figure 3 also presents the densities for the lowest and highest
income quintiles. We find that a greater mass of low-income people are not increasing
their self-protective behaviors. We see the opposite pattern for high-income people,
with a greater share of high-income people adopting more self-protective behav-
iors. This pattern is generally consistent for the income quintiles between these two
12In some specifications, we experiment with dropping extreme values under the assumption that they
reflect respondent confusion. However, doing so does not alter our results.
13One might be concerned that self-reported behaviors do not align with actual behaviors and that this
bias relates systematically to income. This would be especially concerning if interviews were conducted
in-person, but the survey was done on a computer. Moreover, studies specific to Covid-19 that have relied
on self-reported information and data collected from devices such as cellphones have corroborated one
another (Giuntella et al. 2020; Huckins et al. 2020).
14To fix ideas, suppose an individual answered 3 (sometimes) for hand washing and 3 (sometimes) for
taking public transport before the pandemic and 5 and 4, respectively, during the pandemic. The increase
in hand washing accounts for 2 increases in self-protective behaviors and the increase in taking public
transportation is recorded as a 1 increment decrease in self-protective behaviors. Taken together this results
in a net effect of 2 − 1 = 1.
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Fig. 2 Average frequency of select behaviors by income quintile and time period: These tabulations are
the average frequency respondents within an income group reported doing each listed activity. Possible
responses were 1 (never), 2 (rarely), 3 (sometimes), 4 (very often), and 5 (always). These are calculated
for the time period before the pandemic, at the start of the pandemic and a few weeks into the pandemic
groups. For example, if we were to plot the distribution for the third quintile, its peaks
would be nested between the peaks for the first and fifth income quintiles. A goal of
this paper is to understand what factors explain these different behavioral responses.
In our subsequent analysis, we focus on three measures of behavior change. The
first is from the aforementioned question asking respondents directly if they changed
their behavior in response to the pandemic. The second is a composite behavior vari-
able for social distancing. We focus on: visiting large open spaces, visiting large
closed spaces, attending large social gatherings, and visiting with friends or family.
As we are mainly interested in how behaviors change, we look at how this social
distancing composite changes over time. An increase in social distancing is defined
as an above-median increase in the number of self-protecting improvements for the
four behaviors of interest. The third measure focuses on changes in hand washing
and wearing a mask. Each of these measures provides insight into how individual
behaviors are changing during the pandemic and cover a range of costs. Changing
any behavior and increasing hand washing or masks wearing are relatively low-cost
shifts. Increasing social distancing behaviors is more costly and may be harder for
some groups of people to do.
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Income Quintile: 1 5
Fig. 3 Distribution of behavior changes: Distribution of behavior changes from before the pandemic to a
few weeks after the pandemic started for all 15 behaviors included in our survey data. Changes are nor-
malized such that self-protecting changes are positive and reductions in these behaviors are negative. The
densities for the lowest and highest income quintiles are broken out separately. The dashed line represents
the mean number of behavior changes across all income quintiles
We make four types of drops from the full US survey sample for our analyses.
First, we drop respondents who did not report an income quintile or gender (15
observations). Second, as discussed previously, our composite behavior dependent
variables examine increases in behaviors. We drop respondents who reported always
engaging in these behaviors and who thus had no ability to increase further (40 obser-
vations for social distancing and 73 for hand washing-mask wearing). The third set of
drops are the outliers in local infection rate beliefs (36 observations). Finally, we drop
17 respondents whose work status is unclear. For each dependent variable, we hold
the analysis sample constant across specifications to facilitate comparisons. Thus for
each outcome, we take the maximum number of observations that remain after these
sets of drops.
While we are looking at changes in behaviors, it is important to note that we
observe differences in the levels of engagement in these behaviors across income
quintiles before the pandemic. For example, in Fig. 2 we can see that people in the
fifth income quintile reported attending large social gatherings at a higher rate than
those in the lowest income quintile. The level of other pre-Covid behaviors, such
as hand washing and mask wearing, are more similar across income quintiles. This
pattern suggests that higher income individuals may necessarily need to adopt more
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self-protective behaviors than lower income people, who only need to make relatively
minor adjustments after the outbreak of the pandemic.15 Despite these larger behavior
changes, higher income people may be engaging in these behaviors at a higher rate
at the end of the sample than lower income individuals.
We need to be mindful of this pattern in our analysis. For instance, if we do not
account for the initial levels at which respondents engaged in these behaviors, we
categorize people as not increasing their social distancing behaviors when, given our
definition, it was not possible for them to do so. Any findings under this approach
could be biased, potentially reflecting differences by income in pre-pandemic behav-
ior versus pandemic-induced adoption of self-protective behavior. Thus, to account
for the level of activities before the pandemic started, we remove individuals for
whom it was not possible to exhibit an above-median increase in social distancing
behaviors.16 This results in a drop of 137 individuals from our analysis sample. More-
over, we find evidence that keeping these individuals in the sample does bias results
towards finding stronger income gradients since dropped individuals tend to be in
lower income quintiles (in part reflecting that they are older). Having dropped these
individuals, we are left with an analysis sample consisting of respondents who were
engaged in enough social activities that they could have an above-median shifts in
behavior in response to the pandemic. We argue that the costliness of adopting these
behaviors varies across income and other observed socioeconomic factors. In the next
section, we demonstrate that people in lower income quintiles do indeed face sub-
stantial burdens that make behaviors such as social distancing more costly relative
to members of higher income quintiles, which helps to explain why they adopt them
less often.
5 Results
5.1 Connecting socio-demographic characteristics to income
The first panel of Table 2 summarizes the difference in means of several charac-
teristics by income groups. Here, we have defined high income as the top three
quintiles and low income as the bottom two quintiles. We find significant differences
for most of these characteristics between high-income and low-income respondents.
For example, non-white respondents were more likely to be low income than white
respondents. Low-income respondents were slightly less likely to have a pre-existing
health condition than those with high incomes. Of note, we find no significant income
differences for beliefs in the effectiveness of social distancing. We also see that lower
income people have a significantly smaller probability of increasing two of the self-
protective behaviors we consider at the 5% level, while the other is significant at the
15We kindly thank a referee for pointing out this concern.
16This is one way to address pre-pandemic activity levels. We explored others, including different behav-
ior change thresholds and restricting the sample to not include the lowest or highest income quintiles.
Generally, our findings were similar under these approaches.
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Table 2 Differences in means by characteristic and income group
Characteristic 1 2
Low High Diff. p value Middle High Diff. p value
Socio-demographics
Non-White 0.20 0.12 0.08 0.00 0.13 0.11 0.02 0.51
Male 0.31 0.52 − 0.20 0.00 0.40 0.68 − 0.28 0.00
New York-California 0.47 0.57 − 0.11 0.00 0.44 0.69 − 0.25 0.00
Elderly 0.47 0.35 0.12 0.00 0.43 0.22 0.21 0.00
Health
Pre-existing condition 0.43 0.46 − 0.03 0.40 0.48 0.42 0.06 0.21
Housing
Urban 0.37 0.43 − 0.06 0.05 0.29 0.62 − 0.34 0.00
Home w/o open air access 0.24 0.10 0.15 0.00 0.12 0.10 0.02 0.48
Elderly exposure 0.49 0.44 0.05 0.11 0.51 0.37 0.14 0.01
Work arrangements and losses
Working 0.59 0.77 − 0.18 0.00 0.69 0.85 − 0.16 0.00
Full-time | working 0.23 0.66 − 0.43 0.00 0.54 0.82 − 0.29 0.00
Part-time | working 0.20 0.11 0.09 0.00 0.15 0.09 0.06 0.12
Can work from home | working 0.76 0.84 − 0.08 0.01 0.76 0.91 − 0.15 0.00
Stopped working | working 0.58 0.30 0.28 0.00 0.40 0.15 0.25 0.00
Tele-working | working 0.11 0.44 − 0.33 0.00 0.27 0.58 − 0.3 0.00
Still working | working 0.24 0.18 0.06 0.07 0.22 0.16 0.05 0.22
Mean lost HH. income ($1000) 0.40 0.51 − 0.11 0.00 0.46 0.55 − 0.09 0.07
Beliefs and perceptions
Social distancing effectiveness 0.70 0.75 − 0.05 0.10 0.73 0.78 − 0.05 0.27
Local infection rate 0.36 0.44 − 0.08 0.01 0.32 0.51 − 0.18 0.00
Benefits from pandemic 0.76 0.89 − 0.13 0.00 0.85 0.90 − 0.05 0.12
Outcomes
Changed behavior 0.81 0.92 − 0.11 0.00 0.89 0.95 − 0.06 0.02
Increased SD 0.50 0.57 − 0.07 0.06 0.56 0.58 − 0.02 0.75
Increased hand washing-mask wearing 0.63 0.76 − 0.13 0.00 0.77 0.77 0.00 0.98
N 1006 406
This table contains the results from difference of means tests for the listed characteristics. The calculated
means are for the proportion of people that are low income vs high income and medium income vs high
income. For the first panel low income is defined as the bottom two income quintiles and high income
is defined as the top three quintiles. For the second panel, middle income is defined as the third quintile
and high income the fifth quintile. The “Diff.” column is the difference of these means and the p value
associated with the difference
10% level. The second panel compares the difference in means between members
of the third income quintile and the fifth quintile. Many of the differences that exist
between income groups in the first panel persist here. However, unlike the first panel,
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we no longer see significant differences along individual characteristics such as race,
access to open air at home, working part-time, continuing to work and lost income.
When looking at behaviors we find no significant difference between middle- and
high-income people increasing social distancing and increased hand washing or mask
wearing behaviors. We still see a difference in the amount of people in each group
changing any behavior. This is consistent with our discussion of the relationship
between income and behavior in Fig. 1. We draw two conclusions from this table.
First, there are significant demographic and behavioral differences between low- and
high-income individuals in our sample. Second, while there are fewer differences
between middle- and high-income respondents, significant differences along some
demographics and one of our behaviors persist. These findings suggest that policy-
makers need to pay attention to lower income populations to ensure they engage in
self-protective behaviors. Addressing income or job losses could be useful ways to
encourage more widespread adoption of self-protective behaviors.
Figure 6 in the Appendix explores expected losses to labor and household income
by labor status and income quintile. Expected losses to labor income are a much
larger share of income for low-income respondents. For example, people in the first
income quintile reported expected labor income losses of over 10% while respon-
dents in the fifth income quintile expected losses of no more than 5%. We observe
a similar pattern when looking at expected household income losses. First quintile
expected losses range from nearly 20% to about 25% while fifth quintile losses range
from 10% to just under 15%. We also find that the difference between the mean
expected labor income loss for the first and fifth income quintile is statistically sig-
nificant. Figure 4 assesses losses that have already occurred. We observe a similar
relationship between income quintile and the magnitude of income losses in the first
panel. The second panel examines changes in work status. We see that transitions
to tele-working rise with income. We observe the reverse pattern for low-income
people, who were most likely to have stopped working altogether. The third panel
further examines job losses due to the pandemic. We find that the lowest income
respondents had the least amount of job security and the highest probability of tem-
porary unemployment. An interesting pattern is that higher income individuals were
the most likely to permanently lose their jobs, despite also having the highest level
of job security across all income quintiles. This may reflect selection: higher income
jobs are more secure in general so a job loss reflects a large and permanent shift,
e.g., a bankruptcy. Similar to expected income losses, the difference between mean
household income losses for the first and fifth income quintile was statistically sig-
nificant. Taken together, these figures demonstrate how the burdens of the pandemic
have fallen especially hard on the lower income quintiles. These are the people who
have lost relatively more income and employment, which may make it harder for
them to engage in self-protective behaviors.
Next, we consider work arrangements by income. Figure 7 in the Appendix con-
sists of two panels, which plot labor status (full-time, part-time, self-employed or
not working) and how well they can work from home, respectively. According to the
figure, full-time employment and the ability to work from home rise with income.
Lower income people are more likely to report either that they stopped working or
that they experienced no change in work status (which includes not having switched
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Fig. 4 Realized losses and labor market changes by income: Realized income losses by income quintile.
Income losses are normalized by the mean income of the respondent’s quintile. Changes in work status are
the proportion of respondents within an income quintile that were observed working within the sample. Job
losses are proportions of each type of labor transition within an income quintile. To improve readability,
we have omitted the markers for the quintile means and display the linear trend. These trends were tested
for statistical significance
to tele-working). For example, nearly 75% of respondents in the fifth income quintile
are working full-time. About the same percentage of respondents in the first quin-
tile are not working. From the center panel of Fig. 4, we see that more than 50%
of respondents in the fifth income quintile reported transitioning to tele-work post-
pandemic, whereas only 10% of those in the first quintile did so. This pattern appears
consistent with the fact that nearly 40% of low-income respondents report being
unable to work from home.17
The other broad categories of socio-demographic characteristics that are poten-
tially associated with income and behavior changes are pre-existing health condi-
tions, household features and beliefs related to the pandemic. From Table 1 we know
that 45% of survey respondents reported having a pre-existing health condition such
as diabetes, high blood pressure, heart disease, or asthma. Table 3 breaks down
the prevalence of specific pre-existing conditions by income quintile. Given strong
income-health gradients found in other literature, it is surprising that we do not find
17We also ran a multinomial logit model where the outcome variable is our work status variable to study
which factors predict which types of work changes and find that these patterns hold. These results are
available in the Supplemental Appendix of Papageorge et al. (2020).
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Table 3 Pre-existing health conditions by income
Income Diabetes High blood pressure Heart disease Asthma
First quintile 0.14 0.30 0.06 0.13
Second quintile 0.14 0.32 0.05 0.12
Third quintile 0.19 0.32 0.05 0.14
Fourth quintile 0.16 0.28 0.05 0.15
Fifth quintile 0.25 0.21 0.05 0.14
This table summarizes the share of respondents with various pre-existing health conditions that fall into
each income quintile for the US sample. Respondents may have multiple conditions
a meaningful relationship between income and most health conditions. For instance,
we find higher proportions of diabetes among higher income people in our sample.
This may reflect that the sample is not representative of the USA in terms of the
relationship between income and health.
In contrast, housing is strongly related to income. As seen in Table 4, higher
income respondents are far more likely to live in urban areas (versus suburban or
rural), homes (versus apartments), and have access to open air where they reside
compared to lower income respondents. These housing characteristics influence the
cost of self-protective behaviors. For example, larger home types or having access to
open air can make it easier to maintain social distancing. This is an area where pol-
icy actions now could alleviate the harm from future pandemics. Increasing access to
open air in public housing or parks could be effective ways to address the behavior
discrepancies we observe between low- and high-income respondents. As we noted
earlier, we do not observe a pattern between income and beliefs in the effectiveness
of social distancing.18 Across all income quintiles, 70–78% of respondents believe
social distancing is either very effective or extremely effective. This suggests pol-
icymakers have been successful in sharing some information about the pandemic.
However, we will later discuss that there is a gap between these beliefs and the
adoption of self-protective behaviors across income groups.
The survey data also contain respondents’ beliefs about various rates related to
the disease such as infection rates, likelihood of contracting the disease, and so on.
However, it is difficult to interpret responses. For example, consider beliefs about the
local infection rate. The distribution of these beliefs is presented in Fig. 8. We can
see that many respondents report implausibly small and large numbers. This could
reflect several factors, including misinformation about the spread of illness, difficul-
ties with probabilistic thinking, which is well documented in the literature (see, e.g.,
Barth et al. 2020; Lillard and Willis 2001; Delavande et al. 2006), fatalistic beliefs
18We measure a respondent’s belief in social distancing as the average of their beliefs about the effective-
ness of shutting down non-essential businesses, limiting mobility outside the home, and forbidding mass
gatherings.
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Table 4 Home characteristics by income
Variable First Second Third Fourth Fifth
Current home area
Urban 0.41 0.33 0.29 0.41 0.62
Semi-urban/residential 0.41 0.52 0.60 0.49 0.35
Countryside 0.18 0.15 0.11 0.10 0.03
Total 168 190 210 243 196
Current home type
House 0.43 0.56 0.63 0.78 0.77
Apartment 0.39 0.29 0.24 0.15 0.18
Condominium 0.03 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.05
Trailer 0.10 0.07 0.04 0.01
Shelter 0.02
Other 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01
Total 168 190 210 243 196
No open air access
Not selected 0.67 0.83 0.88 0.92 0.9
Selected 0.33 0.17 0.12 0.08 0.1
Total 168 190 210 243 196
This table summarizes the share of respondents within each income quintile broken out by different cate-
gories of home characteristics for the US sample. Shares are calculated within each of the three categories.
The total values are the total number of respondents within each income quintile
(e.g., Akesson et al. 2020), optimism about herd immunity, etc.19 Another possibility
is that misinformation about the pandemic initially spread by the federal government
and news media may have “spoiled” the way people link less direct beliefs to out-
comes. This in part motivates why we opt to include beliefs about the effectiveness of
social distancing to ensure that people who believe these behaviors are effective are
also the people engaging in them more frequently. In any case, these interpretational
difficulties will limit conclusions we can draw using some of the beliefs variables.
5.2 Factors associated with behavior change
Our analysis until now shows that several factors are related to income. These factors
could potentially help to explain differences across income groups in self-protective
behaviors depicted in Fig. 1. In this section, we explore which socio-demographic
19Indeed, we must leave open the possibility that, due to our lack of knowledge about the illness, high
answers are correct. As of November 2020, this scenario seems increasingly unlikely given yet another
surge in cases and hospitalizations in the USA following well-publicized outbreaks in April and July
(Madrigal and Kissane 2020).
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characteristics are associated with behavior changes. We begin by providing sum-
mary statistics and then discuss and analyze findings from our main estimates from
regressions of behavior change onto different sets of explanatory variables.
Table 5 summarizes the difference in means across various characteristics for
those who increased social distancing behavior according to our metric. We find
significant differences between males and females and between those who believe in the
effectiveness of social distancing. These findings suggest that women are more likely than
men to increase social distancing as are those who believe strongly in the effectiveness
of social distancing. We see a significant difference between those who increased social
distancing behaviors and work statuses. Specifically, we see that respondents who
continued to work (as opposed to stopping work or transitioning to tele-work)
engaged in increased social distancing at a lower rate than those who had transi-
tioned to another work arrangement. We also see that respondents in New York and
California were more likely to increase social distancing behaviors than individuals
from Texas or Florida, which may be explainable by political factors. Older respon-
dents also increased social distancing more than younger respondents. This pattern
appears consistent with the elevated risk elderly people face from Covid-19. Another
significant difference can be seen between respondents without access to open air at
home, which we view as a barrier towards adopting this self-protective behavior. We
do not find significant differences across other individual characteristics. Finally, we
also see that people increasing social distancing behaviors have a significantly larger
probability of increasing other self-protective behaviors. This finding is reassuring,
as we would expect to see co-movement among the various measures we consider.
For our main analysis, we examine three outcomes: any behavior change, social
distancing, and mask wearing or hand washing. As mentioned earlier, while we
examine three different outcomes, we are testing one main hypothesis: whether socio-
demographic factors predict the adoption of self-protective behaviors. We view using
three measures of behavior as important. First, each of these behaviors impose a
different cost for individuals. Different types of people may be more responsive to
low-cost behaviors such as changing behaviors or hand washing-mask wearing as
opposed to more costly behaviors such as social distancing. Second, as these behav-
iors are correlated with one another, common findings across each of these behaviors
serves as a form of robustness for the demographic patterns we identify.
For each outcome, we estimate linear probability models as a function of income
and different sets of explanatory variables. We use heteroskedastic robust standard
errors. Our main findings are summarized in Table 6. We discuss these results and
other findings in greater detail in the following subsections. In general, we find that
income, work arrangements such as tele-working, lost income and beliefs about the
effectiveness of social distancing are significantly associated with the self-protective
measures we examine. Detailed results are presented in Tables 7, 8 and 9 in the
Appendix. In each table, all columns include income quintiles as explanatory vari-
ables. Column (1) includes only income, column (2) adds in socio-demographic
characteristics, column (3) adds in pre-existing health conditions, column (4) brings
in housing characteristics, column (5) introduces work arrangements and economic
loss characteristics, and column (6) adds in beliefs about social distancing and local
infection rates and perceived benefits from the pandemic. Finally, in column (7) we
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Table 5 Difference in means by characteristic for increased social distancing
Characteristic Yes No Diff. p value
Socio-demographics
Non-White 0.13 0.16 − 0.03 0.26
Male 0.36 0.53 − 0.18 0.00
New York-California 0.58 0.49 0.10 0.00
Elderly 0.43 0.34 0.10 0.00
Health
Pre-existing condition 0.43 0.44 − 0.01 0.87
Housing
Urban 0.37 0.43 − 0.06 0.11
Home w/o open air access 0.08 0.17 − 0.08 0.00
Elderly exposure 0.49 0.43 0.06 0.08
Work arrangements and losses
Working 0.68 0.76 − 0.08 0.01
Full-time | working 0.52 0.57 − 0.05 0.26
Part-time | working 0.15 0.13 0.03 0.33
Can work from home | working 0.81 0.82 − 0.01 0.74
Stopped working | working 0.39 0.36 0.03 0.49
Tele-working | working 0.38 0.33 0.05 0.24
Still working | working 0.14 0.24 − 0.1 0.00
Mean income quintile 0.48 0.43 0.05 0.16
Mean lost HH. income ($1000) 0.49 0.51 − 0.02 0.63
Beliefs and perceptions
Social distancing effectiveness 0.84 0.64 0.20 0.00
Local infection rate 0.35 0.45 − 0.11 0.00
Benefits from pandemic 0.87 0.85 0.03 0.27
Outcomes
Changed behavior 0.95 0.85 0.10 0.00
Increased hand washing-mask wearing 0.92 0.53 0.39 0.00
N 824
This table contains the results from difference of means tests for the listed characteristics. The calculated
means are for the proportion of people that increased social distancing behaviors versus those that did not
increase these behaviors. The Yes column is the average value of the characteristic for those that increased
social distancing. The No column is the average value of the characteristic among those who did not
increase social distancing. The “Diff.” column is the difference of these means and the p value associated
with the difference
include all of these sets of controls in a single specification. We will discuss each of
these columns in the following subsections.20
20We examined other characteristic associations beyond what is presented in the paper. Table 10 in the
Appendix lists some of the other associations we explored.
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Table 6 Summary of factors associated with self-protective behaviors
Variable Metric CB SD WB Variable Metric CB SD WB
Income Significant ✓ ✓ ✓ Countryside Significant ✗ ✗ ✗
Sign + + + Sign NA NA NA
Non-White Significant ✗ ✗ ✓ No access to open air Significant ✗ ✓ ✗
Sign NA NA + Sign NA – NA
Male Significant ✗ ✓ ✗ Not working Significant ✗ ✗ ✓
Sign NA – NA Sign NA NA +
Florida Significant ✗ ✓ ✗ Tele-working Significant ✓ ✓ ✓
Sign NA – NA Sign + + +
New York Significant ✗ ✗ ✗ Not working pre-Covid Significant ✗ ✓ ✗
Sign NA NA NA Sign NA + NA
Texas Significant ✗ ✓ ✗ Lost income Significant ✓ ✓ ✓
Sign NA – NA Sign + + +
56 or older Significant ✗ ✗ ✓ Effectiveness of SD Significant ✓ ✓ ✓
Sign NA NA + Sign + + +
Pre-existing condition Significant ✓ ✓ ✓ Area infection rate Significant ✗ ✓ ✓
Sign +/– – + Sign NA – –
Semi-urban/residential Significant ✗ ✗ ✓ Benefits Significant ✓ ✓ ✓
Sign NA NA – Sign + + +
This table summarizes the findings from linear probability models examining the association between
socio-demographic characteristics and three different self-protective behaviors. Detailed tables with coef-
ficient estimates, standard errors, significance levels and other controls can be found in the Appendix.
“CB” stands for changed behaviors, “SD” stands for increased social distancing behaviors, and “WM”
stands for increased hand washing or mask wearing
5.2.1 Income
Across all three of our dependent variables we find strong, statistically significant
associations with income. Higher income individuals are more likely to engage in
the behaviors we examine. To fix ideas, relative to the first income quintile, a mem-
ber of the fifth income quintile is 10–15 percentage points more likely to change
their behaviors, 11–24 percentage points more likely to increase social distancing
behaviors, and 17–25 percentage points more likely to increase hand washing or
mask wearing. Put another way, when all controls are included, a member of the fifth
income quintile is 13% more likely to change their behaviors, 32% more likely to
increase social distancing and 30% more likely to increase hand washing or mask
wearing. We find that these income effects are fairly robust to the inclusion of con-
trols. From the baseline to the case where we include all of our controls, the size of the
coefficient estimates remain fairly stable as we add additional variables, which means
that these other factors do not fully explain the income gradient. The slight exception
is for the increased social distancing outcome. When all of our controls are added,
we only see a significant difference between the fifth and the first income quintiles,
715
N.W. Papageorge et al.
suggesting that our explanatory variables help to explain the relationship between
income and what appears to be the a costly self-protective measure. In general, the
income gradients presented here strongly suggest that the adoption of self-protective
behaviors is a costly prospect, one that is easier for people with more income. While
providing cash transfer could help, the income gradients alone do not provide very
much policy guidance. Thus, we now consider whether additional factors associated
with self-protective behavior adoption.
5.2.2 Gender, age, race and location
The next set of control variables we examine are gender, age, race and state. We do
not find many significant associations between these factors and the change behav-
iors outcome. In the baseline case we see negative associations between males, people
56 years or older, and some regional effects. Some of these relationships lose signif-
icance when other variables are added to the analysis, though we find more robust
patterns when examining increases in social distancing behavior. We find strong neg-
ative associations between males, and respondents from Florida and Texas, which
maintain significance once other controls are added. To fix ideas, we find that males
are 23% less likely than females to increase social distancing. This could be evidence
that the pandemic is driving women into “traditional” care taker roles—staying at
home to maintain the household—while males continue to work in person and are
unable to adopt social distancing behaviors. Similarly, we find that relative to respon-
dents from California, people in Texas and Florida tended to be 21% and 22% less
likely to increase social distancing, respectively. These results may presage the surges
in Covid-19 cases that happened in these two states that began towards the end of June
2020. This finding complements recent work that has found a significant relation-
ship between political affiliation and beliefs about the Covid-19 pandemic and the
adoption of social distancing behaviors. These are states led by governors who were
less responsive to the outbreak of the pandemic, which may have had an influence on
behavior. Finally, we find positive significant associations between race and people
56 years or older for the hand washing-mask wearing outcome. Specifically, we find
that Black respondents are 19% more likely than white respondents to increase hand
washing or mask wearing.21 We find a similarly sized relationship for those 56 years
or older. It is interesting that find these effects for increased hand washing or mask
wearing. This may reflect the fact that of the three activities we examine, this one is
a relatively low-cost way to self-protect for people who face risks, but are unable to
engage in higher cost, less practical activities, such as social distancing.
5.2.3 Health
We also examine various pre-existing health conditions, including diabetes, high
blood pressure, heart disease, asthma, allergies, and other conditions. Overall, and
21A data set that over-samples non-white individuals would potentially reveal other differences by race or
ethnicity in the likelihood of engaging in self-protective behaviors.
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surprisingly, these variables are not strongly correlated to behavior change. Oddly,
we find a strong negative association between heart disease and increased social dis-
tancing, which may reflect that people with heart disease are generally unhealthy and
thus less likely to engage in self-protective behaviors. Yet, it is surprising that health
conditions more strongly associated with serious illness (e.g., diabetes, asthma, or
high blood pressure) are not associated with behavior change. An exception is that
we find a robust significant association between allergies and increases in hand wash-
ing and mask wearing. Allergies would presumably be less likely to be associated
with unobserved factors capturing an unwillingness or inability to engage in self-
protective behaviors. Another possibility that people with allergies could feel they are
becoming ill even if they are not and thus be more willing to take precautions. More
generally, the lack of a health gradient could be a byproduct of our non-representative
sample. As mentioned previously, pre-existing conditions were not targeted for repre-
sentativeness either in the data collection process. As our understanding of Covid-19
grows, future data collection efforts may want to target specific health conditions to
determine if an association with self-protective behaviors exists.
5.2.4 Housing
Next we examine housing characteristics. We find a negative significant relationship
between respondents in the countryside and changing behaviors but this association
becomes indistinguishable from zero as other controls are added. We find a robust
negative association for having no access to open air space at home and increased
social distancing behavior. In our full control case, we find that respondents that live
in homes without open air access are 20% less likely to increase social distancing
behaviors. We find this to be an intuitive result. People who are more comfortable
sheltering-in-place are more likely to do it. Policies aiming to slow the pandemic
should take these factors into account as they suggest cramped and uncomfortable
housing can potentially undermine efforts to “flatten the curve.” This result could
also guide the design of future housing policy as government prepare for future pan-
demics. For example, communities could increase the size and availability of public
parks to accommodate social distancing. Governments could also prioritize the open-
ing of parks or other open public spaces during a pandemic, though of course the
risks in terms of increased exposure would need to be weighed against the benefits in
terms of higher rates of social distancing among low-income people. Another, longer
run possibility would be to incorporate some open air spaces such as balconies or
community gardens into the designs for public housing, which would help facilitate
social distancing behavior. Finally, we find similar patterns for the two other outcome
variables, though estimates are less precise in the final specification.
5.2.5 Work arrangements and losses
We also consider work arrangements and economic losses. In general we find fairly
consistent results across all three of our outcome variables. People who transitioned
into tele-working are more likely to change behaviors, increase social distancing, and
increase hand washing-mask wearing. This association ranges from roughly 9–15
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percentage points relative to somebody who continued to work. When all controls are
included, a person that transitions to tele-work is 20 to 28% more likely to increase
these self-protective behaviors. This effect is robust to the inclusion of other controls.
We find a similarly sized effect for those that stopped working or never worked but
significance was retained with less consistency. This result is intuitive. People who
can work from home are more likely to abide by stay at home orders. Factors related
to work arrangements, which vary across socio-demographic groups, can determine
the sustainability and effectiveness of policies aiming to prevent the spread of ill-
ness.22 From a policy perspective, governments could offer incentives or resources
for firms to increase the availability of tele-work to their employees. Beyond prepar-
ing for future pandemics, this policy may also help firms compete for talent along
non-monetary dimensions. For example, it appears that tele-medicine may remain
after the Covid pandemic (Smith et al. 2020). Of course, this type of policy has its
limits as some work, by its nature, requires physical contact.
We also find that realized household income losses have a significant positive
association with each of these behaviors. After controlling for extreme lost income
values, we find that for every $1,000 lost a respondent is 1–4 percentage points more
likely to adjust each of the behaviors we examined. People who have experienced
these losses have already been harmed by the pandemic. As a result, they may be
more careful than others and view contracting the disease as a higher risk. Another
possibility is that these people have fewer monetary resources and may not have
money to cover medical expenses if they were to contract the disease. This speaks
to the importance of polices that provide direct monetary relief to people during a
pandemic. Our results suggest that policies such as the CARES Act, which featured
direct compensation to all citizens is an effective way to promote the adoption of
self-protective behaviors. Other studies of the CARES Act have shown it was a use-
ful short-term policy to help people smooth their consumption during the pandemic
(Carroll et al. 2020).
5.2.6 Beliefs and perceptions
The final set of variables we examined were beliefs and perceptions about the pan-
demic. Reassuringly, we find a fairly consistent effect for beliefs in the effectiveness
of social distancing across the three behaviors we included. These findings are
strongest for the changed behaviors and increase social distancing variables. We find
similar results but with weaker significance for increased hand washing-mask wear-
ing. Yet, there is a disconnect between these beliefs and individual behavior. For
example, approximately 97% of respondents in the first and fifth income quintiles
believe social distancing is effective. However, 80% of people in the first income
quintile reported changing any behavior while 93% people in the fifth income quin-
tile reported any behavior change. We see a similar discrepancy when looking at
increases in social distancing behaviors: 45% of respondents in the first quintile and
22These estimates can be converted into moments perhaps usable in an epidemiological model. For exam-
ple, across income quintiles, the probability that an average respondent would increase social distancing
behavior if they began tele-working ranged from about 50 to 66%.
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57% in the fifth income quintile. This leads us to the somewhat depressing conclusion
that is, however, entirely in line with our results: many people from lower income
groups recognize the effectiveness of self-protective measures, but do not adopt
them, suggesting different costs of doing so compared to higher income people. For
example, low-income people tend to not have access to tele-working, which affords
people the opportunity to maintain social distancing without having to sacrifice labor
income.
One finding that surprised us was the negative association between beliefs about
local infection rates and increases in self-protecting behaviors. As discussed previ-
ously, the distribution of respondent beliefs about local infection rates has significant
mass at the low and high end, which are difficult to reconcile with reality. In Figs. 9,
10, and 11 we present Lowess smoother results for three behavioral outcomes of
interest and this belief.23 In each case, people who reported an infection rate of 20%
or fewer exhibit the expected response: a rise in perceived infection rates is associ-
ated with more protective behavior. Thus, negative coefficient estimates are driven
by people with implausibly high perceptions of infection rates. This could reflect
respondent confusion. It could also reflect a sort of fatalism, i.e., people believe infec-
tion rates are so high that they are bound to become infected, too, and thus don’t
bother to engage in protective behaviors. Fatalism is a well-documented phenomenon
in several fields (see, e.g., Akesson et al. 2020; Ferrer and Klein 2015; Shapiro and
Wu 2011). These findings suggest that pockets of misinformation persist within the
population. It is crucial that policymakers provide accurate and complete information
about the risks of the pandemic and how people can best protect themselves from
infection.
We also find some positive associations between perceived benefits from the pan-
demic and increases in our behaviors of interest. Less pollution and more family time
were two that came out as significant and tended to retain significance as other con-
trols were added. In Appendix Table 11, we present cross-tabulations of the survey
data which indicate most of the people identifying these benefits belonged to higher
income quintiles.
5.3 Robustness checks
We conduct a series of robustness checks to these specifications. The results for these
analyses are available in the Supplemental Appendix of Papageorge et al. (2020).
First we consider whether a respondent was engaging in these self-protective behav-
iors at all following the start of the pandemic. We also look at whether there were
distinct behavior differences between those that had experienced a loss due to the
pandemic and the pooled sample. In another test examine each state individually and
pooled groups of states. In general, these analyses align with our main results. We
also consider the intensive margin for increased social distancing and hand washing
or mask wearing behaviors. A respondent’s income and beliefs about the effective-
ness of social distancing did not have a significant association with larger increases
23Similar figures using the lpoly smoother are available in the Supplemental Appendix of Papageorge et al.
(2020).
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in either of these self-protecting behaviors. Other effects are consistent with our
main analysis. Finally, as mentioned previously, the data collected by Belot et al.
(2020b) do not contain information on educational attainment. We use information on
a respondent’s profession to construct a proxy for whether they have a college degree
and incorporate it into our specifications.24 We find that education is positively asso-
ciated with increases in self-protective behaviors. The inclusion of this variable does
not appreciably alter our other findings.
6 Conclusion
The Covid-19 pandemic has shaken the world. The USA in particular has struggled
with its response immensely and is engaged in a contentious debate about the best
path forward. The debate often focuses on the strictness of safety measures to bal-
ance public health concerns with economic costs. Often absent from the debate is that
any policy will have unequal consequences for different socioeconomic groups and,
moreover, that different groups respond differently to incentives. In this paper we
examined how socio-demographic factors predict the adoption of protective behav-
iors during the Covid-19 pandemic in the USA using unique survey data collected
during the third week of April 2020 by Belot et al. (2020b). This collection effort
was specifically tailored to the pandemic, enabling us to incorporate unique variables
such as work status changes and beliefs into our analysis.
We examined three different self-protective behaviors (i) whether the respon-
dent changed any behavior, (ii) whether the respondent increased social distancing
behaviors and (iii) whether the respondent increased hand washing or mask wearing
behaviors. While these behaviors varied in terms of the costs imposed on individuals,
they are all correlated and informative about which types of people are respond-
ing to the pandemic. We find that income, work arrangements such as tele-working,
lost income and beliefs about the effectiveness of social distancing are significantly
associated with the self-protective measures we examine. These findings are gener-
ally robust to the inclusion of several controls and sample adjustments. Our results
highlight the heaviest burden of these measures are placed on those who are already
suffering the most from the pandemic. For instance, members of the first income
quintile, who have endured substantial monetary losses, are less likely to have access
to tele-working, forcing them to choose between their health and a paycheck. More
broadly, we have demonstrated that many of the socioeconomic health gradients
present in other settings are also present during the Covid-19 outbreak. This informa-
tion provides crucial insights into the real world implications of the current pandemic
and ought to inform policymakers as they respond to the latest resurgence of the
disease.
24According to this variable, 30% of the sample is college educated and the average income is 3.88 for the
college educated and 2.78 for people without a college education.
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Our analyses highlight many areas for policymakers to address behavioral differ-
ences and prepare for future pandemics. First, increasing access to open air could
reduce the cost of adopting behaviors such as social distancing. One way to achieve
this end could be the prioritization of opening more public parks either before a
pandemic or when designing lockdown measures. Another is to revisit the design
of public housing to include open air spaces such as balconies or community gar-
dens. Second, increasing access to tele-work for more employees will lower the
burden of self-protective behaviors. Governments could either incentivize firms to
offer this work arrangement or provide them with resources to make it available.
Firms may also benefit from this measure as it improves their ability to attract talent
in labor markets. Third, governments can offer direct monetary relief to citizens to
ease the burdens of the pandemic. This policy can insulate people from seeking addi-
tional work that may prevent them from following self-protective behaviors. Finally,
existing long-term data collection efforts should incorporate questions with an eye
towards future public health crises. This could take many forms but some examples
include information about work arrangements and beliefs in government experts and
institutions.
While many of the questions raised and discussed in this paper focus on a spe-
cific point in time, the Covid-19 pandemic will eventually run its course. However,
it would be shortsighted and naive to think that another virus, perhaps an even more
damaging one, will not come about in the future. Indeed, some specialists believe that
this virus will be cyclical, returning annually. If so, the questions we are addressing
now will be important not only as we move through the current crisis, but also as we
begin to prepare for the next one. Social scientists who study behavior—and the poli-
cies that affect it—must play a critical role in these efforts. One way is through the
collection and analysis of new survey data, which shed light on what behavior can
be expected of different segments of the population during a pandemic given hetero-
geneity in the incentives, constraints and circumstances people face. These data could
be used not only to describe behavior, but also in more targeted research projects,
such as: examining how information is transmitted and beliefs about the pandemic
are formed and affect behavior, analyzing location-specific policy responses and their
relative merit, and calibrating epidemiologically grounded models relating variation
in individual behavior to the spread of illness, among many others.
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Fig. 5 Probability of work arrangement by age group and income quintile: Proportion of respondents
within an age group or income quintile that are classified into our work arrangements variable. To improve
readability, we have omitted the markers for the quintile means and display the linear trend. These trends
were tested for statistical significance
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Fig. 6 Expected income losses by income and labor status: The left panel summarizes expected labor
income losses across income quintiles and labor statuses (i.e., working full-time, part-time, self-employed,
or not working at all). The right panel summarizes expected household income losses along the same
two dimensions. In both panels, expected losses are normalized by the mean income of the respondent’s
quintile. To improve readability, we have omitted the markers for the quintile means and display the linear
trend. These trends were tested for statistical significance
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Not Able Not Well
Quite Well Somewhat Well
Unaffected
Able to Work From Home
Fig. 7 Probability of labor characteristic by income quintile: This figure shows the proportion of respon-
dents within each income quintile that have different labor market characteristics. The left panel shows
the work status of respondents (i.e., working full-time, part-time, self-employed, or not working at all).
The right panel depicts how well a respondent can work from home. The share of respondents that are
not working (and thus unable to work from home altogether) are omitted. To improve readability, we
have omitted the markers for the quintile means and display the linear trend. These trends were tested for
statistical significance
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Fig. 8 Distribution of beliefs about local infection rates: Distribution of the reported beliefs of respondents
about the rate of infections within their local community. The raw data are presented in the bars, while the
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Fig. 9 Lowess smoother changed behaviors: Plots the application of the Lowess smoother to the relation-
ship between the binary changed behaviors outcome and beliefs about the local infection rate for the US
analysis sample
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Fig. 10 Lowess smoother increased social distancing: Plots the application of the Lowess smoother to
the relationship between the binary increased social distancing outcome variable and beliefs about the
local infection rate for the US analysis sample. Increased social distancing is defined as an above-median
increase in self-protective behaviors (e.g., visiting public spaces, visiting friends and family) from before
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Fig. 11 Lowess smoother increased hand washing-mask wearing: Plots the application of the Lowess
smoother to the relationship between the binary increased hand washing-mask wearing outcome variable
and beliefs about the local infection rate for the US analysis sample. Increased hand washing-mask wear-
ing is defined as an above-median increase in hand washing or mask wearing behavior from before the
pandemic to a few weeks after it started
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A.2 Tables
Table 7 Factors associated with changing behaviors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Income
Second quintile − 0.00 − 0.00 − 0.01 − 0.01 − 0.01 0.00 − 0.00
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Third quintile 0.09∗∗ 0.09∗∗ 0.09∗∗ 0.08∗∗ 0.07∗ 0.08∗∗ 0.07∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Fourth quintile 0.11∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Fifth quintile 0.14∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Socio-demographics
Black − 0.04 − 0.02
(0.04) (0.04)
Other − 0.04 − 0.05
(0.05) (0.05)
Male − 0.06∗∗ − 0.03
(0.02) (0.02)
Florida 0.01 − 0.00
(0.03) (0.03)
New York − 0.03 − 0.04
(0.03) (0.03)
Texas − 0.05 − 0.04
(0.03) (0.03)
56 or older − 0.05∗∗ − 0.02
(0.02) (0.03)
Health
Diabetes − 0.05 − 0.05∗
(0.03) (0.03)
High blood pressure − 0.03 − 0.01
(0.03) (0.03)






Other condition 0.06∗∗ 0.06∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)
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Table 7 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Housing
Semi-urban/residential − 0.03 − 0.03
(0.02) (0.02)
Countryside − 0.08∗∗ − 0.05
(0.04) (0.04)
No access to open air − 0.04 0.00
(0.03) (0.03)
Work arrangements-losses
Stopped working 0.10∗∗ 0.07
(0.04) (0.04)
Began tele-working 0.12∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗
(0.04) (0.04)




Flag extreme lost income − 0.05∗∗ − 0.03
(0.03) (0.03)
Lost HH Inc./$1000 Orig − 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Lost HH Inc./$1000 Adj. 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Beliefs-perceptions
Slightly effective 0.24∗∗ 0.23∗∗
(0.10) (0.10)
Moderately effective 0.25∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗
(0.10) (0.10)
Very effective 0.33∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.09)
Extremely effective 0.37∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.09)
Infected in area 0.04 0.01
(0.04) (0.04)
More free time 0.02 0.01
(0.02) (0.02)
More family time 0.05∗∗ 0.04∗
(0.02) (0.02)
Less pollution 0.06∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
Less noise − 0.03 − 0.03
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Table 7 (continued)




Observations 955 955 955 955 955 955 955
R2 0.033 0.049 0.046 0.040 0.064 0.099 0.138
This table presents estimates from regressions of whether a respondent changed any behavior after the
pandemic started and various individual characteristics. Column (1) only considers income. Column (2)
adds socio-demographics to income. Column (3) adds pre-existing health conditions to income. Column
(4) adds housing characteristics to income. Column (5) adds work arrangement and losses to income.
Column (6) adds beliefs and perceptions about the pandemic to income. Column (7) includes all of these
controls in a single specification
Heteroskedastic robust standard errors in parentheses
∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Table 8 Factors associated with social distancing more—previously not
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Income
Second quintile 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.03 0.08 0.04 0.05
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Third quintile 0.12∗ 0.15∗∗ 0.11∗ 0.07 0.13∗∗ 0.07 0.08
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Fourth quintile 0.10∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.10 0.06 0.14∗∗ 0.09∗ 0.10
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Fifth quintile 0.16∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗ 0.11∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗ 0.15∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Socio-demographics
Black − 0.03 0.01
(0.06) (0.06)
Other − 0.03 − 0.10
(0.08) (0.07)
Male − 0.19∗∗∗ − 0.14∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04)
Florida − 0.12∗∗ − 0.14∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05)
New York − 0.05 − 0.02
(0.05) (0.04)
Texas − 0.15∗∗∗ − 0.13∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05)
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Table 8 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)





High blood pressure 0.00 − 0.02
(0.04) (0.04)
Heart disease − 0.22∗∗ − 0.19∗∗
(0.10) (0.09)









Countryside − 0.00 − 0.05
(0.06) (0.06)
No access to open air − 0.16∗∗∗ − 0.09∗
(0.06) (0.05)
Work arrangements-losses
Stopped working 0.16∗∗∗ 0.07
(0.06) (0.06)
Began tele-working 0.15∗∗ 0.11∗
(0.06) (0.06)




Flag extreme lost income 0.04 0.08
(0.06) (0.05)
Lost HH Inc./$1000 Orig − 0.00 − 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Lost HH Inc./$1000 Adj. 0.04∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Beliefs-perceptions
Slightly effective 0.12 0.07
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Table 8 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(0.13) (0.15)
Moderately effective 0.08 0.03
(0.12) (0.14)
Very effective 0.29∗∗ 0.24∗
(0.12) (0.14)
Extremely effective 0.36∗∗∗ 0.27∗
(0.12) (0.14)
Infected in area − 0.24∗∗∗ − 0.21∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.08)
More free time − 0.00 0.01
(0.03) (0.03)
More family time 0.07∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04)
Less pollution 0.16∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04)




Observations 781 781 781 781 781 781 781
R2 0.009 0.067 0.020 0.022 0.053 0.132 0.202
This table presents estimates from regressions of whether a increased social distancing behaviors after the
pandemic started and various individual characteristics. Column (1) only considers income. Column (2)
adds socio-demographics to income. Column (3) adds pre-existing health conditions to income. Column
(4) adds housing characteristics to income. Column (5) adds work arrangement and losses to income.
Column (6) adds beliefs and perceptions about the pandemic to income. Column (7) includes all of these
controls in a single specification
Heteroskedastic robust standard errors in parentheses
∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Table 9 Factors associated with increased washing hands-wearing mask
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Income
Second quintile 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.05
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Third quintile 0.19∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Fourth quintile 0.13∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗ 0.10∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗
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Table 9 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Fifth quintile 0.20∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗






Male − 0.06∗ − 0.01
(0.03) (0.03)
Florida 0.02 − 0.00
(0.04) (0.04)
New York 0.04 0.05
(0.04) (0.04)
Texas − 0.03 − 0.03
(0.04) (0.04)
56 or older 0.14∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04)
Health
Diabetes − 0.07∗ − 0.06
(0.04) (0.04)
High blood pressure 0.09∗∗∗ 0.04
(0.03) (0.03)






Other condition 0.08∗ 0.05
(0.05) (0.04)
Housing
Semi-urban/residential − 0.02 − 0.06∗
(0.03) (0.03)
Countryside − 0.04 − 0.07
(0.05) (0.05)
No access to open air − 0.12∗∗ − 0.07
(0.05) (0.05)
Work arrangements-losses
Stopped working 0.19∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗
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Table 9 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(0.05) (0.05)
Began tele-working 0.13∗∗ 0.13∗∗
(0.06) (0.05)




Flag extreme lost income − 0.02 − 0.03
(0.05) (0.05)
Lost HH Inc./$1000 Orig − 0.00∗∗ − 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Lost HH Inc./$1000 Adj. 0.02∗∗ 0.02∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Beliefs-perceptions
Slightly effective − 0.03 − 0.04
(0.13) (0.13)
Moderately effective 0.10 0.08
(0.12) (0.12)
Very effective 0.22∗ 0.19
(0.11) (0.12)
Extremely effective 0.30∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗
(0.11) (0.12)
Infected in area − 0.20∗∗∗ − 0.20∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.07)
More free time − 0.04 − 0.04
(0.03) (0.03)
More family time − 0.02 0.00
(0.03) (0.03)
Less pollution 0.09∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)
Less noise 0.05 0.04
(0.03) (0.03)
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Table 9 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Other 0.09 0.05
(0.07) (0.07)
Observations 891 891 891 891 891 891 891
R2 0.026 0.058 0.046 0.034 0.059 0.120 0.175
This table presents estimates from regressions of whether a increased hand washing or mask wearing
behaviors after the pandemic started and various individual characteristics. Column (1) only considers
income. Column (2) adds socio-demographics to income. Column (3) adds pre-existing health conditions
to income. Column (4) adds housing characteristics to income. Column (5) adds work arrangement and
losses to income. Column (6) adds beliefs and perceptions about the pandemic to income. Column (7)
includes all of these controls in a single specification
Heteroskedastic robust standard errors in parentheses
∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01










Able to work from home
Ability to work from home (scale)
Combinations
Losses
Work change due to pandemic
Expected labor income losses
Expected household income losses
Combinations
Beliefs-perceptions




This table lists some of the additional variables that were considered as part of our linear probability model
analysis
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Table 11 Benefits of pandemic by income
More family time Less pollution
Income quintile Not selected Selected Total Not selected Selected Total
First 0.64 0.36 168 0.64 0.36 168
Second 0.67 0.33 190 0.61 0.39 190
Third 0.59 0.41 210 0.56 0.44 210
Fourth 0.53 0.47 243 0.59 0.41 243
Fifth 0.43 0.57 196 0.61 0.39 196
This table summarizes the share of respondents within each income quintile that identified more family
time and less pollution as benefits of the pandemic for the US sample
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